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Most people wait a lifetime for a day in court. Judges, however, spend a professional
lifetime dealing with people waiting for their day in court. It is therefore exceptional
enough if judges need to have their own such day. It is plain worrisome when they then
need to end up at the European Court of Justice on the argument that what they have
available at home is no longer a proper court, meaning a judicial body previously
established by law and populated by impartial and independent judges. 22 September
2020 was such a day for two veritable Polish and therefore European judges: Judge
Waldemar Żurek (C-487/19) and Judge Monika Frąckowiak (C-508/19). I went to
support them – and learn.
Both cases turn on recent developments regarding selection and promotion of judges in
PiS-led Poland. More specifically, how to deal with a situation where PiS now controls
this process through a politically captured Council for the Judiciary/neo-KRS (the
National Court Register), so that only political loyalists are appointed and individuals
qualified to be a (higher) judge not even considered? (The proposal by the Executive
Board of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary to expel it is awaiting
COVID-postponed approval by the ENCJ general assembly.) And how, as a matter of
Union law, should we deal with the situation where complaints about such selection and
promotion decisions by judges are dealt with by individuals serving in a politically
captured Chamber of the Supreme Court, be it the Disciplinary Chamber or the
Extraordinary Control Chamber, that are therefore not legally courts?
During the hearings it was extensively discussed whether the preliminary questions
were admissible, whether Article 19(1), second subparagraph TEU has direct effect, and
how Article 47 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is relevant.
Parties exchanged views about what the Court’s AK judgment actually says (see here
and here for analyses), and in what way it is a relevant precedent. The Advocate
General, Tanchev, ruined his Christian (or Orthodox) Christmas by promising he will
issue an Opinion in both cases on 12 January 2021. As the preliminary questions were
not brought under an emergency procedure, this means that an ECJ judgment will likely
arrive almost two years after the events giving rise to these cases occurred.
Rather than summarising a day of sometimes heated exchanges (see for detailed
reporting here, and subsequent tweets, and the thread here ), I will focus on four issues.
These four dawned on me while digesting a second day (see here for a report on a first
day) of listening specifically to Polish government authorities in Luxembourg, and their
exchanges with the lawyers of judges Waldemar Żurek and Monika Frąckowiak, the
Commission and the excellent representatives of the independent Polish
Ombudsman/Commissioner for Human Rights. They all require breaking out of a safe
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premise that things can be contained through dialogue, comparative reporting, peer
reviewing etc. Even a decent link with the new budget and the Covid Recovery Funds,
although crucial, will be insufficient. Listening in Luxembourg teaches us that
backsliding in the EU is already happening before our eyes and should therefore be the
EU institutions’ immediate starting point – as Kelemen has well explained. More than a
legal fight, it is a battle of and for ideas, playing out – literally – in open court.
Lesson 1: Pay (closer) attention to what autocrats actually
(publicly) argue
Listening to a party argue its case in a courtroom, one intuitively filters what is said
through one’s own (legal) premises, particularly when Union law terms presumed to be
shared principles are employed. I did the same. The first time I listened to honourable
representatives of the Polish government I therefore kept wondering how one of the
biggest EU Member States could put up such a baffling, and bafflingly weak defence. It
was not even trying to make a decent argument. (On 8 April the Court confirmed that
the defence had been irrelevant – see Case 791/19 R). I initially thought it was just
putting up a (bad) show and playing for time to ensure faits accomplits, in the full
knowledge that what was being argued makes little legal sense (and therefore that
winning the case was secondary).
On 22 September 2020 the pattern was similar. In contrast to arguments tabled by the
other parties, those put forward by the Polish Prosecutor General’s Office and
government (although formally two parties, sadly one and the same thing by now)
seemed as sharply separated from conventional Union law interpretation as the COVID-
plexiglass screens now separate each of the ECJ judges from one another. Yet, my
thinking on what this signifies is shifting. I sense it is both more simple and more
complex. Simpler, because the Polish government may actually mean what it literally
says, even if as a European I have a hard time accepting and internalising that. Indeed,
it has not been shy about explicitly stating its position. Consider these literal passages
from the intervention of Mrs Dalkowska, the deputy minister of justice representing
Poland (and, tellingly, also still a judge), that I wrote down:
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“What is crucial in this case, but also what is crucial for the functioning of the whole EU
legal order and the EU, what is crucial is this fundamental right of an individual to an
independent and impartial court against the background of legal certainty provided by the
fundamental principle of irremovability of a judge. … The requirement of independence
of judges is part of the right to fair trial. This is a basic guarantee for an individual.
…
Let me now explain the rules for appointment of judges. It is about staffing of
constitutional bodies… Among Member States there is no uniform constitutional or
legislative model. Judges are appointed by the President of Poland at the request of the
Council of the Judiciary for an indefinite period of time. .. The act of appointment is an
independent act. It completes the appointment procedure. Once it has been issued by the
President it is not possible according to Polish law to undermine the status of a judge in
any way or to call into question the presidential prerogative in any way. This is how this
mechanism has been shaped. This is how we guarantee the independence of judges. The
prerogative of the President is of a special nature. It is a personal prerogative of the head
of state. The review of this procedure would only be possible if it were provided for by
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, and it is not… So it is not possible to question
the status of judges of the Supreme Court… The status of a judge cannot be contested.
…
The irremovability of judges plays a constitutional role. It is of universal nature and pan-
European. Also the Court of Justice has underlined the importance of the irremovability of
judges.
…
There is one more thing regarding the alleged politicised KRS, when it comes to any
possible lack of judicial review of the resolutions of the KRS. Poland believes that judicial
review is not necessary. The process does in no way infringe Article 19 TEU.
…
We have heard it is a black and white system when it comes to judges. That is true. I am a
judge myself. I was appointed by the President. And I enjoy the right of being
irremovable, like all other judges in Poland and Europe. Now, this principle is real. …
There is no possibility to undermine the status of a judge. Neither on the basis of Polish
law nor EU law. If we allowed for such a situation, we would question this very basic
principle of irremovability of judges. And from this principle stems the legal certainty and
the stability of judges.”
If you take this literally, as I now think it may be meant to be taken, this makes things
more complex. We may be using the same words in the same context but endow them
with distinct significance and connect them quite differently. It becomes clear that what
the Polish government means when it discusses issues relating to the ‘rule of law’ is
‘rule by law’ (educate yourself with this fabulous 1.5 minute video by the great Sticky
Tricky Law aka Dr. Joelle Grogan). More precisely, the current Polish government
defends pure majoritarianism where the executive and legislative form the point of
gravity in the trias politica, remake (all national) law and expect judges to apply (only)
that. What is meant by impartiality of judges is then fulfilling a role in the context of
rule by (national majoritarian) law – as an individual appointed in the service of the
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executive and legislative to decide on disputes as long as it fits the (national) law of the
moment. Irremovability of judges is mainly about hedging your bets for a situation
where you may be voted out so that you ensure that your political affiliates still populate
another part of the trias politica to perpetuate your vision. (And if you are lucky, as a
judge you can also become the deputy minister of justice by the side at the same time).
It is a mistake to discard this rhetoric and argumentation as irrelevant. It is a publicly
stated de facto attempt by a large Member State to re-interpret basic Union law
principles, what they require and how they hang together. However starkly at odds with
how Union law has been founded and interpreted so far, what is put forward is a full-
fledged competing ideology dressed up in the stolen clothes of familiar legal terms. It is
an ideology that is incompatible with EU rule of law in all of its elements.
Lesson 2: Protect rule of law terminology (and develop new
words to describe autocratic action)
One remarkable and telling episode in the hearings, even if it will likely have zero
bearing on the outcome, was this. The Polish representative, in the final round of
comments in Case 487/19, said the following in reply to arguments made by the lawyers
of Judge Żurek that he had effectively suffered harassment in the way he had been
treated:
“I would like to draw your attention that we are before a court of law. So we should limit
ourselves to legal issues and refrain from political comments. … Political arguments have
been raised by the lawyers of Judge W.Z. and by the agent for the Ombudsman, so I will
allow myself to make one comment. In this context, facts, historical background and a
political background are important. After the year 1990, after the fall of communism,
Poland did not reform its justice system. All studies conducted on the justice system
before the year 2015 and later, including the most up to date studies, show that the
reforms should be continued. The trust towards the justice system in Poland is at the level
of 12%, so around 80% of the Polish population believes that reforms should be
continued. These reforms were commenced in 2017, and right now, what we are
witnessing, and all these cases, are the result of a dispute on the organisation and the
functioning and the direction that these reforms should take. .. It is not the case that
judges in Poland, and especially judge W.Z. would be harassed. … The lawyers use such
terms when talking about [the individual appointed to the Extraordinary Control
Chamber] … His judgments are called so-called judgments, the neo-KRS is called quasi-
KRS. Isn’t this harassment, my lords, my ladies?”
Again, you could easily think of this as pure rhetoric and thin-skinned semantics. But by
the tone of voice and the gestures used, as well as the fact that this was the very first
issue the representative chose to address in her final word, I suggest it may well have
run deeper. Not just an instrumental attempt to get rid of all the pending cases against
Poland regarding judicial independence or avoid further ones (there are now four
infringement cases, about 20 preliminary references pending and more than ten cases
4/10
from Poland pending in Strasbourg – see these comprehensive graphs by Professor
Pech). Not even simply feeling insulted in the heat of an argument in front of an
attentive crowd of top judges. It felt like a craving for acknowledgment in Luxembourg
and elsewhere that what is openly pursued in Poland is not only legal but also legitimate
as a matter of Union law.
We should not satisfy that craving. Because that would signify our complacency with
backsliding. Finding the words to express this consistently is not so easy, however. We
will need to learn how to talk about what is happening in a way that we protect our own
terminology to describe and characterise all things rule of law compliant. Laurent Pech,
for example, has consistently called irregularly or illegally appointed individuals serving
in a function where you would normally find judges with all the concomitant
qualifications and disposition “fake judges”, or “usurpers”. Other descriptions could
perhaps work too (judicial imposters?). A similar challenge is describing the body these
individuals then sit in, because, by definition, it is not a court. And how do you talk
about what comes out of such bodies? By definition, that is not a judgment or ruling.
More tricky, but keeping in mind the difficult but deeply honourable situation that
judges such Waldemar Żurek and Monika Frąckowiak may already or soon find
themselves in – how to characterise hybrid institutions and their outcome that are
composed partly of judges, and partly not? This is how autocracy seeps in.
We need new terminology. I would suggest, however that it is important not to use “so-
called” or quotation marks (“judge”, “judgment”, “court”). Both subtle qualification and
negation reinforce a frame, lead to false equivalence between legal and illegal, and end
up polluting our own cherished terminology linked to the rule of law. That is too much
honour for autocrats, however they sell or self-perceive their story.
Lesson 3: Swiftly grasp the urgency of widening judicial non-
independence in Poland
One of the most baffling elements of the hearings was a number mentioned by – of all
people – the representative of the Polish government. That number was 180.000. 180
THOUSAND. That is the number of decisions that she reported have been issued by (or
involving) the 570 newly neo-KRS appointed individuals since the PiS captured the
selection and appointment system of in 2018. Who knows how many of these decisions
were connected to Union law, but I volunteer my bank account number to receive a
Złoty for each. Is there a better, more concrete measure of the extent of the backsliding
and the urgency of dealing with it head-on as a matter of protecting Union law and
those in Poland who want protection from Union law?
After this most lob-sided defence in the history of the Court, I was curious what the
Commission representative would argue. After all, it had brought various infringement
cases against this very Member State about the very same issue of judicial
independence. It had even started an Article 7 TEU case against Poland based on that
concern too. Again, I wrote down the relevant bit:
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“Let me now discuss the issue of whether a breach of the requirement of independence
and impartiality of a court previously established by law flowing from Article 19(1)(2)
TEU may also affect the act of appointing a person to the position of judge. Here one
should reiterate that the requirements ensuing from Article 19(1)(2) TEU in conjunction
with Article 47 Charter are aimed at protecting the fundamental right of an individual to
an effective legal protection, in this case while applying EU law. Those requirements are
meant to ensure legal protection to an individual while a judge performs his judicial
duties. And, if it is necessary, such a protection may occur by disregarding a ruling issued
by a judge that does not meet the requirements ensuing from Article 19 TEU. In the
opinion of the Commission, as long as such protection is ensured, that is – protection by
disregarding that decision ensuing from the principle of primacy of EU law, it is not
necessary for EU law to interfere with the act of appointing a person to a position of
judge, or the legal relationship between such a judge and the country that appoints him to
the position of judge. To conclude, possible infringement of the requirement of a court
being previously established by law should not affect the validity of the appointment act
for the [individual appointed] as judge who issued the inadmissibility decision [in the
case of Waldemar Żurek] and his position in the Extraordinary Control Chamber.”
As someone who has studied Union law for some twenty-plus years now, at some level,
perhaps, under normal circumstances, I could have had sympathy for the subtle
distinctions drawn. They are probably based on some understanding of where EU
competences end and Member States’ competences begin. They may be based on an
implied understanding too that this subtlety boils down to a distinction without much
difference, because almost all national legal cases can likely be tied to a Union law
aspect in one way or another. That means that the obligations on Polish judges linked to
guaranteeing primacy of Union law will almost always, in almost each case trigger their
obligation to ignore decisions by Polish non-judges if an issue is dealt with within the
scope of Union law.
Yet I would humbly submit that defending rule of law red lines is not a good occasion for
arguments riding on such subtleties and implicit assumptions. It seems to me a
dangerously formalistic stance to take by a Guardian of the Treaties in front of the
highest European Court in the context of all the other cases it has itself brought and in
the face of that number that kept ringing in my ears – 180 THOUSAND.
More importantly, it won’t work in practice either. Put yourself in the shoes of the
courageous individuals who were seated one row back: Waldemar Żurek and Monika
Frąckowiak. We can consider ourselves blessed with their courage, without which we
would be a lot less wise about the state of our Union at this very moment. But we know
that they are by now surrounded by at least 570 (and counting) individuals
masquerading as judges. Is the Commission’s suggested strategy really to wait for real
judges to work around these 570 in almost every case and apply Union law based on
their own obligation as a Union law judge? Where would they go to make their finding
heard now that the last independent pockets of Poland’s highest courts are quickly
being captured if PiS gets its way? Should Ryanair open a daily Warsaw-Luxembourg
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flight for Polish judges? Why not nip the problem in the bud as a matter of interpreting
Union law by attempting to close off the tap of neo-KRS “judicial” appointments
altogether? Why not try to argue that the 570 individuals in question are not judges that
could apply Union law, cannot form courts that would comply with Union law standards
and that, therefore, they and whatever they decide are a direct threat to primacy of
Union law?
Waldemar Żurek and Monika Frąckowiak came to Luxembourg for protection. They
were sold short here by the Commission. But to protect what greater good or legal
principle? In my view, as I argued earlier, the Commission Legal Service could and
should do more to operate more strategically and forcefully, now that reversing matters
in Poland still seems possible if action is quickly undertaken. 570 and 180.000 are
clocks quickly ticking up, not down. I hope the Court of Justice will instead solve this
case from the perspective of fellow judges in Poland.
Lesson 4: Support a broadened focus, embrace the EP
resolution and stand #WithWoj
The Luxembourg hearings were about judicial independence stricto senso. But a fourth
and final lesson to draw from them is the awareness that the current situation of partial
judicial non-independence already has a multiplier effect. The European Parliament has
acknowledged that EU-action with regard to Poland should be broadened to include
more than just a concern with judicial independence. It should be supported in its plea,
expressed in the resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority just a week ago. It
should also be supported in its plea to the Commission to start more infringement
proceedings against Poland, e.g. regarding the neo-KRS, and enforce Court of Justice
rulings in its favour by asking for pecuniary penalties. Just two days in Luxembourg will
convince anyone that PiS will not be convinced by arguments based on conventional
rule of law principles while what it is attempting to do is replace them. Its calculus
needs to be changed in a different way.
What we need to continue to focus on too, apart from judicial independence, is freedom
of expression. One academic who deals fearlessly with the consequences of the PiS
ideology for using his is Professor Wojciech Sadurski. On 2 October he will face his third
trial (for reports about his first and second trial, see here and here), this time a private
criminal trial brought by a captured public TV-station that feels harassed by his
criticism. The petty harassment continues: like on a previous occasion, with less than 24
hours’ notice, it was rescheduled from 24 September. Sadurski is supported by many
organisations and individuals in his insistence on his right. It is important to continue
to sustain and build that coalition. I, for one, will continue to stand #WithWoj. Covid or
not. Because his freedom is mine.
Wojciech Sadurski, Waldemar Żurek and Monika Frąckowiak each fight for Polish and
European liberal democracy in their own way from within their own role. They show us
that there is nothing abstract about fighting for the rule of law in the EU. It does take a
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toll. But that burden can be shared. So let’s chip in in that respect, and help them.
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While you are here…
If you enjoyed reading this post – would you consider supporting our work? Just click
here. Thanks!
All the best, Max Steinbeis
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